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- Sniffer FAQ
-
- Version: 1.7
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- This Security FAQ is a resource provided by:
-
- Internet Security Systems, Inc.
- 2000 Miller Court West Tel: (770) 441-2531
- Norcross, Georgia 30071 Fax: (770) 441-2431
-
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- available. -
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-
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- http://iss.net/
- ftp iss.net /pub/
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- This Sniffer FAQ will hopefully give administrators a clear understanding of
- sniffing problems and hopefully possible solutions to follow up with. Sniffers
- is one of the main causes of mass break-ins on the Internet today.
-
- This FAQ will be broken down into:
-
- * What a sniffer is and how it works
- * Where are sniffers available
- * How to detect if a machine is being sniffed
- * Stopping sniffing attacks:
- o Active hubs
- o Encryption
- o Kerberos
- o One-time password technology
- o Non-promiscuous interfaces
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- What a sniffer is and how it works
-
- Unlike telephone circuits, computer networks are shared communication channels.
- It is simply too expensive to dedicate local loops to the switch (hub) for each
- pair of communicating computers. Sharing means that computers can receive
- information that was intended for other machines. To capture the information
- going over the network is called sniffing.
-
- Most popular way of connecting computers is through ethernet. Ethernet protocol
- works by sending packet information to all the hosts on the same circuit. The
- packet header contains the proper address of the destination machine. Only the
- machine with the matching address is suppose to accept the packet. A machine
- that is accepting all packets, no matter what the packet header says, is said
- to be in promiscuous mode.
-
- Because, in a normal networking environment, account and password information
- is passed along ethernet in clear-text, it is not hard for an intruder once
- they obtain root to put a machine into promiscuous mode and by sniffing,
- compromise all the machines on the net.
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Where are sniffers available
-
- Sniffing is one of the most popular forms of attacks used by hackers. One
- special sniffer, called Esniff.c, is very small, designed to work on Sunos, and
- only captures the first 300 bytes of all telnet, ftp, and rlogin sessions. It
- was published in Phrack, one of the most widely read freely available
- underground hacking magazines. You can find Phrack on many FTP sites. Esniff.c
- is also available on many FTP sites such as coombs.anu.edu.au:/pub/net/log.
-
- You may want to run Esniff.c on an authorized network to quickly see how
- effective it is in compromising local machines.
-
- Other sniffers that are widely available which are intended to debug network
- problems are:
-
- * Etherfind on SunOs4.1.x
- * Snoop on Solaris 2.x and SunOs 4.1 (on ftp playground.sun.com)
- * Tcpdump 3.0 uses bpf for a multitude of platforms.
- * Packetman, Interman, Etherman, Loadman works on the following platforms:
- SunOS, Dec-Mips, SGI, Alpha, and Solaris. It is available on
- ftp.cs.curtin.edu.au:/pub/netman/[sun4c|dec-mips|sgi|alpha|solaris2]/
- [etherman-1.1a|interman-1.1|loadman-1.0|packetman-1.1].tar.Z
- Packetman was designed to capture packets, while Interman, Etherman, and
- Loadman monitor traffic of various kinds.
-
- DOS based sniffers
-
- * Gobbler for IBM DOS Machines
- * ethdump v1.03
- Available on ftp
- ftp.germany.eu.net:/pub/networking/inet/ethernet/ethdp103.zip
- * ethload v1.04
- Companion utility to a ethernet monitor. Available on ftp
- ftp.germany.eu.net:/pub/networking/monitoring/ethload/ethld104.zip
-
- Commercial Sniffers are available at:
-
- * Network General.
-
- Network General produces a number of products. The most
- important are the Expert Sniffer, which not only sniffs on the
- wire, but also runs the packet through a high-performance expert
- system, diagnosing problems for you. There is an extension onto
- this called the "Distributed Sniffer System" that allows you to
- put the console to the expert sniffer on you Unix workstation
- and to distribute the collection agents at remote sites.
-
- * Microsoft's Net Monitor
-
- " My commercial site runs many protocols on one wire - NetBeui,
- IPX/SPX, TCP/IP, 802.3 protocols of various flavors, most
- notably SNA. This posed a big problem when trying to find a
- sniffer to examine the network problems we were having, since I
- found that some sniffers that understood Ethernet II parse out
- some 802.3 traffic as bad packets, and vice versa. I found that
- the best protocol parser was in Microsoft's Net Monitor product,
- also known as Bloodhound in its earlier incarnations. It is able
- to correctly identify such oddities as NetWare control packets,
- NT NetBios name service broadcasts, etc, which etherfind on a
- Sun simply registered as type 0000 packet broadcasts. It
- requires MS Windows 3.1 and runs quite fast on a HP XP60 Pentium
- box. Top level monitoring provides network statistics and
- information on conversations by mac address (or hostname, if you
- bother with an ethers file). Looking at tcpdump style details is
- as simple as clicking on a conversation. The filter setup is
- also one of the easiest to implement that I've seen, just click
- in a dialog box on the hosts you want to monitor. The number of
- bad packets it reports on my network is a tiny fraction of that
- reported by other sniffers I've used. One of these other
- sniffers in particular was reporting a large number of bad
- packets with src mac addresses of aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa but I don't
- see them at all using the MS product. - Anonymous
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- How to detect a sniffer running.
-
- To detect a sniffing device that only collects data and does not respond to any
- of the information, requires physically checking all your ethernet connections
- by walking around and checking the ethernet connections individually.
-
- It is also impossible to remotely check by sending a packet or ping if a
- machine is sniffing.
-
- A sniffer running on a machine puts the interface into promiscuous mode, which
- accepts all the packets. On some Unix boxes, it is possible to detect a
- promiscuous interface. It is possible to run a sniffer in non-promiscuous mode,
- but it will only capture sessions from the machine it is running on. It is also
- possible for the intruder to do similiar capture of sessions by trojaning many
- programs such as sh, telnet, rlogin, in.telnetd, and so on to write a log file
- of what the user did. They can easily watch the tty and kmem devices as well.
- These attacks will only compromise sessions coming from that one machine, while
- promiscuous sniffing compromises all sessions on the ethernet.
-
- For SunOs, NetBSD, and other possible BSD derived Unix systems, there is a
- command
-
- "ifconfig -a"
-
- that will tell you information about all the interfaces and if they are in
- promiscuous mode. DEC OSF/1 and IRIX and possible other OSes require the device
- to be specified. One way to find out what interface is on the system, you can
- execute:
-
- # netstat -r
- Routing tables
-
- Internet:
- Destination Gateway Flags Refs Use Interface
- default iss.net UG 1 24949 le0
- localhost localhost UH 2 83 lo0
-
- Then you can test for each interface by doing the following command:
-
- #ifconfig le0
- le0: flags=8863<UP,BROADCAST,NOTRAILERS,RUNNING,PROMISC,MULTICAST>
- inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 0xffffff00 broadcast 255.0.0.1
-
- Intruders often replace commands such as ifconfig to avoid detection. Make sure
- you verify its checksum.
-
- There is a program called cpm available on ftp.cert.org:/pub/tools/cpm that
- only works on Sunos and is suppose to check the interface for promiscuous flag.
-
- Ultrix can possibly detect someone running a sniffer by using the commands
- pfstat and pfconfig.
-
- pfconfig allows you to set who can run a sniffer
- pfstat shows you if the interface is in promiscuous mode.
-
- These commands only work if sniffing is enabled by linking it into the kernel.
- by default, the sniffer is not linked into the kernel. Most other Unix systems,
- such as Irix, Solaris, SCO, etc, do not have any flags indication whether they
- are in promiscuous mode or not, therefore an intruder could be sniffing your
- whole network and there is no way to detect it.
-
- Often a sniffer log becomes so large that the file space is all used up. On a
- high volume network, a sniffer will create a large load on the machine. These
- sometimes trigger enough alarms that the administrator will discover a sniffer.
- I highly suggest using lsof (LiSt Open Files) available from
- coast.cs.purdue.edu:/pub/Purdue/lsof for finding log files and finding programs
- that are accessing the packet device such as /dev/nit on SunOs.
-
- There is no commands I know of to detect a promiscuous IBM PC compatible
- machine, but they atleast usually do not allow command execution unless from
- the console, therefore remote intruders can not turn a PC machine into a
- sniffer without inside assistance.
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Stopping sniffing attacks
-
- Active hubs send to each system only packets intended for it rendering
- promiscuous sniffing useless. This is only effective for 10-Base T.
-
- The following vendors have available active hubs:
-
- * 3Com
- * HP
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Encryption
-
- There are several packages out there that allow encryption between connections
- therefore an intruder could capture the data, but could not decypher it to make
- any use of it.
-
- Some packages available are:
-
- * deslogin is one package available at ftp
- coast.cs.purdue.edu:/pub/tools/unix/deslogin .
-
- * swIPe is another package available at
- ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/swIPe/
-
- * Netlock encrypts all (tcp, udp, and raw ip based) communications
- transparently. It has automatic (authenticated Diffie-Helman) distibuted
- key management mechanism for each host and runs on the SUN 4.1 and HP 9.x
- systems. The product comes with a Certification Authority Management
- application which generates host certificates (X.509) used for
- authentication between the hosts. and provides centralized control of each
- Hosts communications rules.
-
- The product is built by Hughes Aircraft and they can be reached at
- 800-825-LOCK or email at netlock@mls.hac.com.
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Kerberos
-
- Kerberos is another package that encrypts account information going over the
- network. Some of its draw backs are that all the account information is held on
- one host and if that machine is compromised, the whole network is vulnerable.
- It is has been reported a major difficulty to set up. Kerberos comes with a
- stream-encrypting rlogind, and stream-encrypting telnetd is available. This
- prevents intruders from capturing what you did after you logged in.
-
- There is a Kerberos FAQ at ftp at rtfm.mit.edu in
- /pub/usenet/comp.protocols/kerberos/Kerberos_Users__Frequently_Asked_Questions_1.11
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- One time password technology
-
- S/key and other one time password technology makes sniffing account information
- almost useless. S/key concept is having your remote host already know a
- password that is not going to go over insecure channels and when you connect,
- you get a challenge. You take the challenge information and password and plug
- it into an algorithm which generates the response that should get the same
- answer if the password is the same on the both sides. Therefore the password
- never goes over the network, nor is the same challenge used twice. Unlike
- SecureID or SNK, with S/key you do not share a secret with the host. S/key is
- available on ftp:thumper.bellcore.com:/pub/nmh/skey
-
- Other one time password technology is card systems where each user gets a card
- that generates numbers that allow access to their account. Without the card, it
- is improbable to guess the numbers.
-
- The following are companies that offer solutions that are provide better
- password authenication (ie, handheld password devices):
-
- Secure Net Key (SNK)
-
- Digital Pathways, Inc.
- 201 Ravendale Dr. Mountainview, Ca.
- 97703-5216 USA
-
- Phone: 415-964-0707 Fax: (415) 961-7487
-
- Secure ID
-
- Security Dynamics,
- One Alewife Center
- Cambridge, MA 02140-2312
- USA Phone: 617-547-7820
- Fax: (617) 354-8836
- Secure ID uses time slots as authenication rather than challenge/response.
-
- ArKey and OneTime Pass
-
- Management Analytics
- PO Box 1480
- Hudson, OH 44236
- Email: fc@all.net
- Tel:US+216-686-0090 Fax: US+216-686-0092
-
- OneTime Pass (OTP):
- This program provides unrestricted one-time pass codes on a user by user basis
- without any need for cryptographic protocols or hardware devices. The user
- takes a list of usable pass codes and scratches out each one as it is used. The
- system tracks usage, removing each passcode from the available list when it is
- used. Comes with a very small and fast password tester and password and pass
- phrase generation systems.
-
- ArKey:
- This is the original Argued Key system that mutually authenticates users and
- systems to each other based on their common knowledge. No hardware necessary.
- Comes with a very small and fast password tester and password and pass phrase
- generation systems.
-
- WatchWord and WatchWord II
-
- Racal-Guardata
- 480 Spring Park Place
- Herndon, VA 22070
- 703-471-0892
- 1-800-521-6261 ext 217
-
- CRYPTOCard
-
- Arnold Consulting, Inc.
- 2530 Targhee Street, Madison, Wisconsin
- 53711-5491 U.S.A.
- Phone : 608-278-7700 Fax: 608-278-7701
- Email: Stephen.L.Arnold@Arnold.Com
- CRYPTOCard is a modern, SecureID-sized, SNK-compatible device.
-
- SafeWord
-
- Enigma Logic, Inc.
- 2151 Salvio #301
- Concord, CA 94520
- 510-827-5707 Fax: (510)827-2593
- For information about Enigma ftp to: ftp.netcom.com in directory
- /pub/sa/safeword
-
- Secure Computing Corporation:
-
- 2675 Long Lake Road
- Roseville, MN 55113
- Tel: (612) 628-2700
- Fax: (612) 628-2701
- debernar@sctc.com
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Non-promiscuous Interfaces
-
- You can try to make sure that most IBM DOS compatible machines have interfaces
- that will not allow sniffing. Here is a list of cards that do not support
- promiscuous mode:
-
- Test the interface for promiscuous mode by using the Gobbler. If you find a
- interface that does do promiscuous mode and it is listed here, please e-mail
- cklaus@iss.net so I can remove it ASAP.
-
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter II (short card)
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter II (long card)
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Adapter
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter/A
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Adapter/A
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Busmaster Server Adapter/A
-
- The following cards are rumoured to be unable to go into promiscuous mode, but
- that the veracity of those rumours is doubtful.
-
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205T
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205T/16
- Hewlett-Packard 27250A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/8
- Hewlett-Packard 27245A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/8
- Hewlett-Packard 27247A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/16
- Hewlett-Packard 27248A EtherTwist EISA PC LAN Adapter Card/32
- HP 27247B EtherTwist Adapter Card/16 TP Plus
- HP 27252A EtherTwist Adapter Card/16 TP Plus
- HP J2405A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter NC/16 TP
-
- Adapters based upon the TROPIC chipset generally do not support promiscuous
- mode. The TROPIC chipset is used in IBM's Token Ring adapters such as the 16/4
- adapter. Other vendors (notably 3Com) also supply TROPIC based adapters.
- TROPIC-based adapters do accept special EPROMs, however, that will allow them
- to go into promiscuous mode. However, when in promiscuous mode, these adapters
- will spit out a "Trace Tool Present" frame.
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Acknowledgements
-
- I would like to thank the following people for the contribution to this FAQ
- that has helped to update and shape it:
-
- * Padgett Peterson (padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com)
- * Steven Bellovin (smb@research.att.com)
- * Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
- * Robert D. Graham (robg@NGC.COM)
- * Kevin Martinez (kevinm@beavis.qntm.com)
- * Frederick B. Cohen (fc@all.net)
- * James Bonfield (jkb@mrc-lmb.cam.ac.uk)
- * Marc Horowitz (marc@MIT.EDU)
- * Steve Edwards (steve@newline.com)
- * Andy Poling (Andy.Poling@jhu.edu)
- * Jeff Collyer (jeff@cnet-pnw.com)
- * Sara Gordon (sgordon@sun1.iusb.indiana.edu)
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Copyright
-
- This paper is Copyright (c) 1994, 1995
- by Christopher Klaus of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
-
- Permission is hereby granted to give away free copies electronically. You may
- distribute, transfer, or spread this paper electronically. You may not pretend
- that you wrote it. This copyright notice must be maintained in any copy made.
- If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this paper in any other medium
- (ie magazines, books, etc) excluding electronic medium, please ask the author
- for permission.
-
- Disclaimer
-
- The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
- information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO
- warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the author be
- liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use
- or spread of this information. Any use of this information is at the user's own
- risk.
-
- Address of Author
-
- Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to:
- Christopher Klaus <cklaus@iss.net> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
- <iss@iss.net>
-
- Internet Security Systems, Inc.
-
- Internet Security Systems, Inc, located in Atlanta, Ga., specializes in the
- developement of security scanning software tools. Its flagship product,
- Internet Scanner, is software that learns an organization's network and probes
- every device on that network for security holes. It is the most comprehensive
- "attack simulator" available, checking for over 100 security vulnerabilities.
-
- --
- Christopher William Klaus Voice: (404)441-2531. Fax: (404)441-2431
- Internet Security Systems, Inc. Computer Security Consulting
- 2000 Miller Court West, Norcross, GA 30071
-